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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Detwiler appeals his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated
battery, contending that there were three different errors which occurred during his trial
and sentencing, each of which necessitates a remand of this case.

First, he asserts

that there was a fatal variance between the charging information and the jury instruction
as to the aggravated assault charge.

Second, he contends that the district court

erroneously declined to give his proposed instruction on the necessity defense. Third,
Mr. Detwiler asserts that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him
to

challenge the information

in the presentence investigation

included

report

(hereinafter, PSI) as unreliable or by refusing to redline that information from the PSI at

the sentencing hearing.
As such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this
case for a new trial, or should, at least, vacate the sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing following an adequate opportunity for Mr. Detwiler to challenge the
information in the PSI.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Detwiler encountered a group of men, including Anthony "Kalani" Storch, at
Buster's Bar and Grill in Boise. He tried to engage them in conversation, but they were
not interested, and brushed him off. (Tr., Vol.4, p.190, L.17 - p.191, L.9.) 1 Mr. Detwiler

The transcripts in this case are provided in five independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of
the preliminary hearing, provided in the electronic document "DETWILER prelim."
"Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the April 21, 2011 hearing on
the State's motion to continue. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the transcript
of the motion in limine hearing held on May 19, 2011. "Vol.4" will refer to the volume
1

1

did not react well to their disinterest, and became upset, ultimately shouting some racial
epitaphs at people in the bar.

(Tr., Vol.4, p:191, L 12 - p.192, L.3.) The bartender,

Ashley Haynes, asked Mr. Detwiler to leave the establishment.
Ls.6-17)

(Tr., Vol.4, p.195,

Mr. Detwiler gathered his belongings, and Ms. Haynes escorted him out.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.197, Ls.8-15; Tr., Vol.4, p.381, Ls.5-1

) Mr. Detwiler got into his car and

prepared to leave. (Tr., Vol.4, p.383, Ls.12-14.) However, before he was able to do so,
another group of men approached his car, and tried to get him out of the car.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.383, L.14 - p.384, L.5.) One of them even kicked his driver side door.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.8-1 O; see also Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17 (one of the officers
testifying that "[i]t appears that there was some sort of footprint or scuff from a shoe or a
boot on the door").
Ms. Haynes came back out, followed by Mr. Storch and other members of his
group, to make sure that Mr. Detwiler was safe to be driving.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.198,

Ls.21 - p.200, Ls.1 )) She saw the group of men around Mr. Detwiler's car, and believed
it would not have been safe for him to get out of the car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.)
She was able to get the group of men to back off for the moment, and speak to
Mr. Detwiler through the driver's door, which he had opened for her. (Tr., Vol.4, p.201,
Ls. 17-24.)

After a short conversation, he tried to leave, closing the door before

Ms. Haynes could get out of the way, catching her against the door jamb, though she
was able to get free of the car without further incident.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.202, Ls.4-14.)

Ms. Haynes testified that, while she was sore after the encounter, it was not anything
that would cause her seek medical attention. (Tr., Vol.4 p.262, L 11 - p.263, L.1.)

containing the transcripts of the jury trial. "Vol.5" will refer to the volume containing the
transcript of the sentencing hearing held on August 4, 2011.
2

Mr. Detwiler testified that, in the meantime, his assailants had returned, and one
of them had managed to get his driver side door open again, and was trying to drag him
out of the car. (Tr., Vol.4, 386, Ls.9-14.) This frightened Mr. Detwiler because he was
concerned that, if he ended up in a fight, it could cause serious damage, as he was still
recovering from a head injury received a few months prior, which had resulted in the
removal of part of his skull. (Tr., Vol.4, p.367, L.17 - p.369, L.3 (Mr. Detwiler explaining
the head injury); Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.11-17 (Mr. Detwiler explaining his fear during the
encounter).) He tried to drive away in reverse, but that did not work. (Tr., Vol.4, p.386,
Ls.14-16.) Mr. Detwiler then tried driving his car forward, hoping that would allow him to
get the door closed and activate the car's automatic door-locking function. (Tr., Vol.4,
p.386, L.·17 - p.387, L.2.) Mr. Starch's friend saw the car start moving toward Mr. Storch
and Ms. Haynes and called a warning to them.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.308, Ls.11-16.) While

Ms. Haynes was able to get out of the way, Mr. Storch was hit by the car. (See, e.g.,
Tr., Vol.4, p.206, L.6 - p.207, L.5.)
Luckily, Mr. Storch was thrown clear when the car stopped a few feet later.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.309, Ls.1-4.) According to Mr. Storch, the only injury he received from that
incident was a twisted hip. (Tr., Vol.4, p.316, L.17 - p.317, L.21.) Some patio furniture
was also damaged at some point in the proceedings, but there was testimony that some
of that damage may have resulted from Mr. Storch and/or others throwing patio chairs
at Mr. Detwiler's car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.210, Ls.11-13 (Ms. Haynes describing the damage);
Tr. Vol.4, p.209, Ls.6-18 (Ms. Haynes testifying that she saw a chair thrown, but unable
to identify who threw it); Tr., Vol.4, p.329, Ls.6-7 (Mr. Storch admitting to throwing a
chair at Mr. Detwiler's vehicle).)

Mr. Detwiler was ultimately able to drive away, and

was later arrested.
3

The

charged Mr. Detwiler with Aggravated Battery with a deadly weapon

for hitting Mr. Storch.

(R., pp.50-51.)

It also charged Mr. Detwiler with Aggravated

Assault with a deadly weapon for driving at Ms. Haynes. (R., pp.50-51.) In making the
aggravated assault allegation, the State only articulated a theory of assault-by-threat. 2
(R., p.51.) Finally, it charged Mr. Detwiler with Malicious Injury to Property. (R., p.51.)
The matter ultimately went to trial.
At trial, Mr. Detwiler requested that the district court instruct the jury on two
defenses: self-defense and necessity. (Tr., Vol.4, p.351, Ls.15-23; Tr., Vol.4, p.429,
L.5 - p.432, L.1; see also R., pp.128-35 (defense's proposed instructions on these
defenses).) The district court instructed the jury as to self-defense.
However, it refused to give the necessity instruction.
Tr., Vol.4, p.433, L.18 - p.434, 3.)

(R., pp.249-52.)

(Tr., Vol.4, p.351, Ls.15-23;

It based that decision on two different rationales.

First, the district court decided that there was evidence demonstrating that the
confrontation at Mr. Detwiler's car, as well as the confrontation inside the establishment,
"could well have been brought about by the defendant. And I think that precludes the
defense."

(Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.7-17.)

Second, it asserted that "I am not entirely

convinced that the defendant wishes to admit the illegal conduct occurred, and I think
that's a crucial part of the defense of necessity .... " (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.18-23.)
When it did instruct the jury, the district court also instructed on both theories of assault.
(R., p.240.)

Assault may be committed in one of two ways: (1) the defendant unlawfully
attempted, with the apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another
(hereinafter, assault-by-attempt); or (2) the defendant intentionally and unlawfully
threatened by word or act to do violence to the person of another with the apparent
ability to do so, and creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is
imminent (hereinafter, assault-by-threat). I.C. § 18-901.
2
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The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Detwiler of Aggravated Battery and Aggravated
Assault. (R., pp.218-20.) However, it acquitted Mr. Detwiler on the Malicious Injury to
Property charge. (R., p.220.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged various pieces of
information that had been included in the presentence investigation report (hereinafter,
PSI) as being unreliable. (Tr., Vol.5, p.24, L.14 - p.27, L.1.) However, the district court
told defense counsel, "I'm not going to red-line or remove anything at this point. The
PSI says what it says." (Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; see also Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16
("I'm not removing anything at this point from the PSI."). Originally, the district court said
it would entertain challenges to the PSI at a subsequent hearing, but when defense
counsel requested that the district court schedule such a hearing, the district court
decided to allow defense counsel to explain why it should not consider the information
in the PSI at the ongoing hearing instead.

(Tr., Vol.5, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L.18.)

Nevertheless, when defense counsel subsequently pointed out the unreliability of some
of that information, the district court reiterated its decision to not remove information
from the PSI. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.5, p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.9.) Ultimately, the district court
sentenced Mr. Detwiler to a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for the
aggravated assault, and a concurrent unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years
fixed, for the aggravated battery. (R., p.263.)
Owing to the ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Detwiler did not file a notice of
appeal within forty-two days of that judgment of conviction. (See R., p.283.) However,
he sought and received post-conviction relief, and the district court re-entered the
judgment of conviction, which allowed Mr. Detwiler a new opportunity to file an appeal

5

in this case. (R.,

) As such, he filed a timely notice of appeal from the re-entered

judgment of conviction. (R., p.285.)

6

ISSUES
1.

Whether there was a fatal variance "'""'"
the charging document and the jury
instructions as they related to the charge of aggravated assault.
Whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury as to the necessity
defense.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Mr. Detwiler
to challenge the information in the PSI, and by refusing to redline information
improperly included therein.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
There Was A Fatal Variance Between The Charging Document And The Jury
Instructions As They Related To The Charge Of Aggravated Assault
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[t]he instructions to the jury
must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a
defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged. Othervvise, there can be a
fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document." State v. Folk,
151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011) (internal citation omitted).

When trial counsel does not

object to a variance, the defendant must satisfy the fundamental error test to obtain
relief for the variance on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Day, 1

Idaho 476, 479 (Ct App.

To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the

2013).

error: 1) violated an unwaived constitutional right, 2) is clear from the record, and
3) prejudiced him (i.e., the defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility
that the error contributed to the outcome of the trial). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226
(2010).
In this case, the variance exists as to the theory underlying the aggravated
assault charge. The State alleged only an assault-by-threat theory in the information.
(R., p.51.) However, the district court instructed the jury on two theories: assault-bythreat and assault-by-attempt. (R., pp.240-41.) That variance deprived Mr. Detwiler of
adequate notice as to the crime charge, and therefore, constituted a fatal variance.
As to the first prong of the fundamental error test, the variance in this case
impacted Mr. Detwiler's unwaived constitutional right to due process.

See, e.g.,

Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,417
(1985).

Variances are impermissible when they deprive the defendant of adequate

8

notice of the charges against him, and thereby, infringe on his right to due process.
State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho

1,

(Ct. App. 2012). Basically, they are fatal when

they constitute "constructive amendments" to the information, Day, 154 Idaho at 4 79,
since "any amendment which charges the accused with a crime of greater degree or a
different nature than that for which the accused was bound over for trial by the
committing magistrate is barred by the Idaho Constitution."

State v. Colwell, 124

Idaho 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1993). In this case, the jury was instructed on a theory of the
crime that was not alleged in the information. (Compare R., p.51 (information alleging
only an assault-by-threat theory) with R., pp.240-41 Uury instructions on both an
assault-by-threat and an assault-by-attempt theory).) By charging an additional theory
of the crime, the instructions charged Mr. Detwiler with a crime of a different nature than
that for which he had been bound over for trial by the committing magistrate. As a
result, the variance in this case violated one of Mr. Detwiler's unwaived constitutional
rights.
As to the second prong of the fundamental error test, the variance is clear from
the face of the record: the jury instructions contain a theory of the crime that was not
alleged in the information.

The information alleged that Mr. Detwiler had committed

aggravated assault-by-threat:
That the Defendant ... did intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent
ability threaten by act to do violence upon the person of Ashley Haynes,
with a deadly weapon, to-wit: by intentionally accelerating his [vehicle]
toward Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her person as she stood in
front of the car, which created a well-founded fear in Ashley Haynes that
such violence was imminent.
(R., p.51.) As such, the instruction on aggravated assault provided in relevant part:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of aggravated assault, the state
must prove each of the following: ...

9

3.

the defendant Michael Clay Detwiler committed an
assault upon Ashley Haynes

4.

by intentionally accelerating his [vehicle] toward
Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her person as
she stood in front of the [vehicle] ....

(R., p.241.) However, in defining assault for the jury, the district court instructed on both
the assault-by-threat and the assault-by-attempt theories:
An "assault" is committed when a person: (1) unlawfully attempts, with
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another; or
(2) intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to
the person of another, with an apparent ability to do so, and does some
act which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such
violence is imminent.
(R., p.240.)

Thus, the additional theory of the offense, which appears in the jury

instructions but not in the information, constitutes clear error on the face of the record.
As to the third prong of the fundamental error test, the error prejudiced
Mr. Detwiler because there is a reasonable possibility that the variance impacted the
verdict in this case. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, if an instruction presents
two legal theories, only one of which is correct and "it is not possible to determine if the
jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal theory, this Court must vacate
the conviction and remand the case for a new trial." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301
(2000).

Since it is not possible to determine on which theory the jury convicted

Mr. Detwiler, there is a reasonable possibility that the variance impacted the verdict in
this case.
In fact, the jury sent a question to the judge during its deliberations asking about
the intent element of assault. (Exhibits, p.28.)3 That question explicitly identified the

Exhibit page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF
document "DETWILER ex." The exhibits admitted at trial, as well as the court exhibits
and jury questions, are reproduced in this document.
3
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instruction which contained the variance, and reveals that at least one of the jurors had
reservations about the evidence presented on the aggravated assault charge: "As to
Instruction No. 20 [the definition of assault], does the intent associated with assault
have to be to injure Ashley? If we believe that Ashley was a bystander and not the
intended target of the vehicle, has the intent portion of the statute been met?" (Exhibits,

p.28 (emphasis added).) Basically, the jurors asked if they could convict Mr. Detwiler of
aggravate assault if they believed that Mr. Detwiler was not intending to threaten or
trying to hit Ms. Haynes. Therefore, the erroneous instruction was definitely at issue in
the deliberations process.

Thus, there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous

instruction, which gave the jury broader grounds on which

return a guilty verdict than

set forth in the charging document, contributed to that guilty verdict.
As a result, the variance in this case constitutes fundamental error. Additionally,
because the variance deprived Mr. Detwiler of sufficient notice, it is a fatal variance. As
such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction as to the aggravated assault
charge and remand this case for a new trial.

11.
The District Court Erred By Not Instructing The Jury As To The Necessity Defense
The district court is required to give requested instructions if a reasonable view of
the evidence supports the requested instruction. See, e.g., State v. Howley, 128 Idaho
874, 878 (1996); State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A defendant in
a criminal action is entitled to have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury
through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support
the theory."). The district court may properly refuse to give a requested instruction on
the necessity defense when there is no evidence presented in support of one of the
11

elements of that defense.

e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 417-18 (2009)

(holding that the necessity instruction had been properly withheld because defendant
had not presented evidence that he was acting to avoid a reasonably perceived specific
threat of immediate harm); Howley, 128 Idaho at 879 (holding that the necessity
instruction was properly withheld because there was no evidence that defendants were
acting to avoid a reasonably perceived specific threat of immediate harm, and there was
no evidence that harm could have been avoided by a less offensive means). However,
where there is conflicting evidence as to the elements of the necessity defense,
resolution of that conflict is a question for the jury, and so, the jury should be instructed
in such cases.

on the

v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 856 {1990) (holding

that the defendant was "entitled to present evidence at trial on the common law defense
of necessity.

It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the

elements of that defense").
The defense has the burden of production when it seeks to raise the necessity
defense (the State ultimately bears the burden of proof). See I.C.J.I. 1512. As such, for
the defense to properly request an instruction on necessity, the evidence must show:
"1. A specific threat of immediate harm; 2. The circumstances which necessitate the
illegal action must not have been brought about by the defendant; 3. The same
objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to
the actor; 4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided." Hastings,
118 Idaho at 855. Evidence was presented in support of each element of the necessity
defense, and thus, a reasonable view of the evidence supported the requested
instruction on that defense.

12

There was evidence of a specific threat of imminent harm. Mr. Detwiler testified
that a group of men had approached his car and were trying to get him out of the car
(the implication being that they wanted to fight him), and that one of them actually
kicked the door of his car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Haynes confirmed that a
group of men had gathered around Mr. Detwiler's car and that it was "a bit chaotic."
(Tr., Vol.4, p.200, Ls.17-25.) She also testified that it would not have been safe for
Mr. Detwiler to get out of his car. 4 (Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.) One of the officers who
investigated this incident also confirmed that, "[i]t appears that there was some sort of
footprint or scuff from a shoe or a boot on the door." (Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17.) A
reasonable view of the evidence indicates that Mr. Detwiler was in danger of being
physically attacked by a group of people, which obviously constitutes a specific threat
of immediate threat.
There was evidence that Mr. Detwiler did not bring about the actions leading to
the necessity (i.e., the attack by the group of men outside the bar), since, as defense
counsel pointed out, there was no evidence of a confrontation between Mr. Detwiler
and the group that attacked him at his car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.430, Ls.12-15.) If Mr. Detwiler
did not confront that group of people in the bar, it is a reasonable conclusion that
Mr. Detwiler's actions did not lead to their attack outside. To that point, Mr. Detwiler
testified that he had packed up his belongings and left the bar when asked, though he
did so angrily, and that he was in his car preparing to leave when the group came to
assault him. (Tr., Vol.4, p.381, L.5 - p.383, L.16.) Ms. Haynes also testified that the

4

Ms. Haynes' testimony that it was not safe for Mr. Detwiler to get out of the car
demonstrates that Mr. Detwiler's fear of injury was reasonable. Compare Korn,
Idaho at 417-18 (finding a necessity instruction was properly excluded when there
no evidence that the perception of harm was objectively reasonable); Howley,
Idaho at 879 (same).
13

also
148
was
128

group of people went outside after she had escorted Mr. Detwiler outside. (Tr., Vol.4,
p.1

Ls.1

1 )

One reasonable view of this evidence is that Ms. Haynes had

managed to quell the situation in the bar and Mr. Detwiler was leaving, and that the
group of men who went out after Mr. Detwiler did so to start a new confrontation. (See
Tr., Vol.4, p.430, Ls.5-19.) In that case, a reasonable view of the evidence shows that
Mr. Detwiler did not facilitate the assault which occurred at his car.

As that was the

incident giving rise to the necessity and the allegedly-criminal conduct, that evidence
supports the second element of the necessity defense.
There was evidence that Mr. Detwiler could not have escaped the situation by
some less offensive means, as Ms. Haynes testified the presence of that group of
assailants meant it would not have been

for Mr. Detwiler to have left the car.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.260, Ls.12-16.) As such, the only option available to Mr. Detwiler was to
try and drive away. Furthermore, Mr. Detwiler testified that someone had come up and
opened his driver side door, and was trying to drag him out of the car.

(Tr., Vol.4,

p.386, Ls.9-14.) He also testified that he tried to drive away in reverse, and that effort
failed to end the threat. (Tr., Vol.4, p.386, Ls.14 - p.387, L.2.) As such, reversing away
from the parking area was not an option that would allow Mr. Detwiler to escape the
threatened harm.

(See Tr., Vol.4, p.430, L.20 - p.431, L.3.)

Therefore, there is a

reasonable view of the evidence that there was not a less offensive option for
Mr. Detwiler to have taken.
There was evidence that the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm
avoided. Mr. Storch testified that the only injury he received was a twisted hip, which
had some impact on his ability to work, but did not stop him from working. (Tr., Vol.4,
p.316, L.17 - p.317, L.21.)

Ms. Haynes also testified that she was sore after the
14

encounter, but that it was not anything that would cause her to

medical attention.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.262, L.11 - p.263, L.1.) Mr. Detwiler, on the other hand, testified that he
had suffered a head injury in a fall a few months before the incident, and as part of the
treatment for that, doctors had removed part of his skull. (Tr., Vol.4, p.367, L.17

p.369,

L.3.) He also testified that, as part of his recovery, he had been told to avoid situations
which risked injuries to his head, and he was concerned that being hit in the head
during a fight would lead to a severe head injury because of his particular condition.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.382, Ls.17-21; Tr., Vol.4, p.384, Ls.11-17.)

Therefore, there is a

reasonable view of the evidence that a twisted hip and general soreness is not
disproportionate to being beaten up by a mob risking complications to a recent, stillhealing head injury.
Since there was a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the necessity
defense, the district court needed to give that instruction. Howley, 128 Idaho at 878;

Tadlock, 136 Idaho at 414. Its refusal to do so was based on two rationales, neither of
which justifies its failure to give the merited instruction. As to the district court's first
rationale - that the defense was precluded because Mr. Detwiler's actions "could well
have" led to the confrontation by his car (Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.7-17)- the district court's
conclusion that the circumstances "could well have been brought about by the
defendant" indicates that there was evidence to the contrary in the record which
suggested that Mr. Detwiler's actions may not have brought about the confrontation at
the car.

The fact that there was conflicting evidence as to that element of the necessity

defense does not justify not instructing the jury as to that defense. See Hastings, 118
Idaho at 856 ("It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not [the defendant] has
met the elements of that defense."). Only when there is no evidence offered as to one
15

of the elements of the defense is such a decision justified.
1

Korn, 148 Idaho at 417-

Howley, 128 Idaho at 879. Resolving the conflicting evidence in this regard requires

a determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented,
and it is the jury, not the district court, that is tasked with making that determination.
See, e.g., State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 599 (2013); State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556,
558 (1996).

As a result, the district court erred by deciding not to give a justified

instruction based on its own determination of the facts in this case, a decision which
usurped the jury's function in Mr. Detwiler's trial.
The district court's second rationale for not giving the requested instruction

that

Mr. Detwiler might not want to admit that the illegal conduct occurred (Tr., Vol.4, p.352,
18-23) - is also baseless, particularly in light of the
instruct the jury on self-defense.

that the district court did

As defenses, both self-defense and necessity

constitute justifications for the allegedly-criminal conduct, which means, if the defense is
proved, the defendant will not be punished for what would ordinarily be a criminal act.
See State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 292 (2013).
In Barton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the entrapment defense is
unavailable where the defendant does not admit the underlying criminal offense. See
Barton, 154 Idaho at 292. However, that appears to a product of the unique nature of
the entrapment defense: "Entrapment occurs when 'an otherwise innocent person, not
inclined to commit a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a State agent who, desiring
grounds for prosecution, originates the criminal design and implants in the mind of the
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense."' State v. Koller, 122
Idaho 409, 411 (1992) (quoting State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 n. 1 (1983))
(emphasis added). Unlike entrapment, necessity does not require that the defendant
16

engage in criminal conduct. See Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855; I.C.J.I. 151

Therefore,

idea that the defendant must admit a criminal act is inappropriately applied in the
necessity context
In fact, that distinction is of less consequence in this case, as Mr. Detwiler
expressly admitted some of the underlying conduct, as he testified that he did drive
forward. 5

(Tr., Vol.4, p.386, L.17 - p.387, L.12; compare Tr., Vol.4, p.437, Ls.1-1 O

(describing the intentional act that the prosecution has focused on to be Mr. Detwiler's
act of driving forward).) Therefore, Mr. Detwiler's testimony reveals that he was not
overly concerned, as a trial strategy, with admitting that the underlying conduct
occurred. Rather, it appears that he was asserting that he did not have the necessary
mens rea to be found guilty - he did not intentionally hit Mr. Storch and he did not
intentionally threaten Ms. Haynes. To that end, he was contending that his actions were

justified as a matter of law based on the defenses of self-defense and necessity. There
was a reasonable view of the evidence that his actions were justified by the doctrine of
necessity, and therefore, the district court's second rationale was unfounded in the law.
That is particularly true since the same concern would apply to self-defense as
well. Necessity and self-defense share a similar theory - the defendant's actions are
justified because they were made in response to a threat to the defendant. Since the
district court gave the self-defense instruction, its concern about admitting the
underlying conduct was completely unfounded; such an admission was obviously
evident in the record since the district court had no corresponding concerns with the
proposed self-defense instruction.

Since Mr. Detwiler did admit the actus reus, there was no basis in fact for the district
court's decision to not give the necessity instruction because Mr. Detwiler would have to
admit the underlying conduct occurred. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.352, Ls.18-23.)
5
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Because the district court erroneously refused to give a requested necessity
instruction, which was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, this Court
should vacate the judgment of conviction as to both the aggravated battery and
aggravated assault and remand this case for a new trial.

111.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Allow Mr. Detwiler To
Challenge The Information In The PSI. And By Refusing To Redline Information
Improperly Included Therein
The district court's denial of a motion to strike or delete portions of a PSI is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
App. 2010).

I.C.R. 32(c); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961

Defense counsel made several challenges to the information in the

I materials and requested that all the unreliable information be stricken or red-lined
from the PSI. (Tr., Vol.5, p.6, Ls.10-21; Tr., Vol.5, p.24, L.14 - p.27, L.1.) The district
court stopped defense counsel and declared "I'm not going to red-line or remove
anything at this point. The PSI says what it says." (Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; see also
Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16 ('Tm not removing anything at this point from the PSI.").
That decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, since "it is at the sentencing
hearing-and not beyond-that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to [the
PSl's] contents."

State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007).

When the

defendant demonstrates that information is erroneously included in the PSI, that
information needs to be culled from the PSI. See State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183
(1991 ). The best practice to effectuate the removal of the erroneous information is to
red-line the PSI. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). The reason
the district court needs to remove erroneously-included information at the sentencing
hearing is to prevent it being used against the defendant at subsequent hearings. Id.
18

Therefore, Idaho's appellate cou

have held, the district court needs to give the

defendant an adequate opportunity to explain or rebut adverse information in the PSI.
Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; Molen, 148 Idaho at 961.
If, as here, the district court fails to provide an adequate opportunity for the
defendant to challenge the information in the record or fails to remove the unreliable
information from the PSI, the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a
new sentencing hearing conducted with a proper PSI.

Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183;

Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262. Therefore, because the district court abused its discretion
by not red-lining or otherwise removing the improperly-included information from the PSI
at the sentencing hearing, this Court should, at least, vacate Mr. Detwiler's sentence
and remand for a new sentencing determination.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Detwiler respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Alternatively, he requests that this

Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing with
instruction to allow him an adequate opportunity to challenge the information in the PSI
materials.
DATED this 26 th day of June, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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